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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The seemingly simple question of, “what is a vessel?” has a very complex 
answer.  In the context of United States admiralty law, the definition of the word 
“vessel” has different meanings depending upon which statute has jurisdiction, the 
nature of the circumstances, and the characteristics of the person involved.  There is 
no settled definition of the word.  As a result, the character of ships and vessels can 
hardly be denied to almost any structure, including steam-ships,2 motor driven tugs,3 
canal boats drawn by animal power,4 jet skis,5 a floating elevator,6 and a houseboat.7 
                                                                
1Mr. Nemerofsky is currently pursuing an L.L.M. in Tax at the University of Florida.  He 
is a Certified Public Accountant and holds a B.S. (Accounting), University of Maryland; 
M.B.A. (Information Systems Technology), George Washington University; J.D., Whittier 
Law School. 
2See The Devonshire, 13 F. 39 (C.C.D. Or. 1882) (arguing that the British steam-ship 
Devonshire was a vessel under the Act of March 3, 1855). 
3See Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (including motor driven tugs 
as vessels for purposes of inspection and regulation). 
4See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903) (holding that canal boats drawn by 
animal power on the Erie Canal were vessels). 
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Conversely, sometimes structures that are commonly thought of as vessels are 
denied such status under the law.8  For instance, if one is suing their employer for 
injuries suffered on a barge, the claim may be denied,9 regardless of how gruesome 
the wounds, if the barge is determined not to be a “vessel.” 
The Jones Act is a statute designed to cover seamen injured by the negligent acts 
of their employer, and is indicative of other admiralty statutes which, by their lack of 
a specific definition of the word “vessel,”10 have created controversy in the judicial 
system.  An analysis of a Jones Act “vessel,” therefore, is a good vehicle by which 
one can examine this issue in greater depth.  In the analysis of a Jones Act vessel, an 
inquiry into a Jones Act seaman is a necessary first step. 
This comment proposes a three prong test that suggests several criteria to be used 
by the trier of fact for determining whether something meets the definition of a 
“vessel.”  The objective is to provide a tool that can be used in a variety of situations 
involving different admiralty statutes in an effort to produce a more consistent 
understanding.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Problem 
Courts considering the question of whether a particular structure is a vessel 
typically find the term “is not capable of precise definition.”11  “Much as we would 
like to formulate a definition of ‘vessel’ that captures the essence of the seagoing 
definiendum, no platonic form suggests itself, hence we are left with the halting 
efforts of the common law.”12   
Even in more common usage, the word seems to take on different meanings.  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary describes “vessel” as, “a watercraft or 
                                                          
5See Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a jet ski was 
a vessel covered by the Limitation of Liability Act, ch. 521, 49 Stat. 1479 (1936) (codified at 
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994)).  
6See The Hezekiah Baldwin, 12 F. Cas. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 6,449) (holding that a 
floating elevator used in New York harbor was a vessel subject to a maritime lien). 
7See Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding 
that a powerless houseboat was a vessel capable of being subjected to a maritime lien). 
8See Garret v. Dean Shank Drilling Co., 799 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that an 
injured worker was not entitled to recovery under the Jones Act because the barge upon which 
he was working was not a vessel in navigation).  
9Id. 
10See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994). 
11Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 1984).  In the case of 
Offshore Co. v. Robison, Judge Wisdom noted, “[a]ttempts to fix unvarying meanings . . . to 
such terms as ‘seaman’ [and] ‘vessel’. . . must come to grief on the facts.”  266 F.2d 769, 779 
(5th Cir. 1959).  “Even where the facts are largely undisputed, the question at issue is not 
solely a question of law when, because of conflicting inferences that may lead to different 
conclusions among reasonable men, a trial judge cannot state an unvarying rule of law that fits 
the facts.”  Id. at 780. 
12McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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structure with its equipment whether self-propelled or not that is used or capable of 
being used as a means of transportation in navigation or commerce on water and that 
usu[ally] excludes small rowboats and sailboats.”13  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“vessel” as, “[a] ship, brig, sloop, or other craft used, or capable of being used, in 
navigation on water.”14  Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines states on their ticket, “[t]he 
word “Vessel” shall mean any ship, chartered, operated or provided by Royal 
Caribbean Corp. on which the Passenger may be traveling or, as the case may be, 
against which the Passenger may assert a claim.”15 
Different cultures also characterize the word “ship” using their own set of 
criteria.  By the Roman law, “[n]avim accipere debemus sive marinam, sive 
fluviatilem, sive in aliquo stagno naviget sive schedia sit.  Dig. de Exercit Act,”16 
which loosely translates as “includ[ing] everything which floated upon the waters 
and was accessory to commerce.”17  “Under the [old] French law the definition is 
almost equally as broad.  Says Emerig. Assur. c[hapter] 4, [section] 7, par[agraph] 1: 
The word ‘ship’ (navire) includes every vessel of timber workable to float and to be 
carried upon the water.”18   
B.  Definitions Of “Vessel” Found In Other Admiralty Statutes 
In United States maritime law, different statutes have also identified the term 
“vessel” in various ways.  Some statutes use the term “vessel” without defining it at 
all, while others use specific terminology or nomenclature familiar in the field.19  As 
scholars Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr. commented in their treatise, The 
Law of Admiralty,  
practically all of the business that comes before the admiralty court 
directly or indirectly concerns what are indubitably ‘vessels.’  In the 
dealings of the courts with the structures and objects that have raised the 
question actively, a single clear test is hard to discern; perhaps the best 
approximation would be to say that the term ‘vessel’ is applied to floating 
structures capable of transporting something over the water.20  
In the First Circuit case of DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc.,21 the court found at 
                                                                
13WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2547 (1976). 
14BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1562 (6th ed. 1990). 
15Royal Caribbean Corp., “Contract for Carriage of Passengers,” 1989. 
16A Raft of Cypress Logs, 20 F. Cas. 169, 170 (W.D. Tenn. 1876) (No. 11,527). 
17Id. 
18Id. 
19See discussion infra pp. 4-7. 
20GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 33 (2d ed. 1975) 
(citing Pleason v. Gulfport Shipping Corp., 221 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1955)).  However difficult 
it may be to discern the word “vessel,” summary judgment is only appropriate if, “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
21959 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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least twenty-four maritime or maritime related statutes with slightly different 
wordings for the definition of “vessel.”22  Some examples include: 
1.  The Interstate Commerce Act- “[V]essel means a watercraft or other artificial 
contrivance that is used, is capable of being used, or is intended to be used, as a 
means of transportation by water.”23 
2.  Whaling Convention Act- “Vessel: The word ‘vessel’ denotes every kind, 
type, or description of water craft or contrivance subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States used, or capable or being used, as a means of transportation.”24 
3.  The International Navigational Rules Act of 1977- “[V]essel means every 
description of watercraft, including nondisplacement craft and seaplanes, used or 
capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.”25 
4.  The Anti-Gambling Act- “The term ‘vessel’ includes every kind of water and 
aircraft or other contrivance used or capable of being used as a means of 
transportation on water, or on water and in the air, as well as any ship, boat, barge, or 
other watercraft or any structure capable of floating on the water.”26 
                                                                
22Id. at 1129-30, (Torruella, J., dissenting).  See also The Contraband Seizure Act, § 1(e), 
108 Stat. 1353 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 80301(3) (1994)).  “‘Vessel’ means a 
contrivance used, or capable of being used, for transportation in water, but does not include 
aircraft.” Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, tit. I, § 2, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 201(i) (1994)).  “The term ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other 
artificial contrivance used, or capable or being used, as a means of transportation on water, 
exclusive of aircraft and amphibious contrivances.”; The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 
652, tit. I, § 3, 48 Stat. 1065 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §153 (w)(1) (1994)).  “‘[V]essel’ includes 
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance, except aircraft, used or capable 
of being used, as a means of transportation on water, whether or not it is actually afloat.”; The 
Sentencing Reform Act, ch. 645, § 3615, 62 Stat. 840 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3667 
(1994)).
 
 “As
 
used in this section, ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft used, or 
capable of being used as a means of transportation in water or in water and air.”; Neutrality 
Act of 1939, ch. 2, § 16, 54 Stat. 12 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 456(c) (1994)).  “The term 
‘vessel’ means every description of watercraft and aircraft capable of being used as a means of 
transportation on, under, or over water.”; The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, tit. I, § 1001, 104 
Stat. 486 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37) (1994)).  “‘[V]essel’ means every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on water, other than a public vessel.”; The Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance 
Act, ch. 858, §§ 905(e),1101 (1936) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1271(b) (1994)).  “The term 
‘vessel’ includes all types, whether in existence or under construction, of passenger cargo and 
combination passenger-cargo carrying vessels, tankers, tugs, towboats, barges, dredges and 
ocean thermal energy conversion facilities or plant ships which are or will be documented 
under the laws of the United States . . . .”; The Submarine Cable Act, ch. 17, § 10, 25 Stat. 42 
(1888) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 30 (1994)).  “[T]he term vessel shall be taken to mean every 
description of vessel used in navigation, in whatever way it is propelled . . . .” 
23The Interstate Commerce Act, 92 Stat. 1338 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10102(30) 
(1994)). 
24The Whaling Convention Act, ch. 653, § 2, 64 Stat. 421 (1950) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
916(e) (1994)). 
25The International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, § 2, 91 Stat. 308 (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 1601(1) (1994)). 
26The Anti-Gambling Act, ch. 139, § 23, 63 Stat. 92 (1949) (codified at U.S.C. § 1081 
(1994)). 
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III.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
A.  Historical Perspective 
1.  History of the Jones Act 
The Jones Act is indicative of other statutes in admiralty law that contain 
nebulous definitions of the word “vessel.”  For that reason, it will be helpful in 
analyzing the Jones Act to gain a better perspective of the larger controversy. 
In March 1915, Congress took the first step towards promoting the safety of 
seamen in the merchant marines by passing the Act of March 4, 1915.27  The 
complete name of the legislation was, “An Act to Promote the Welfare of American 
Seaman in the Merchant Marine of the United States; to Abolish Arrest and 
Imprisonment as a Penalty for Desertion and to Secure the Abrogation of Treaty 
Provisions in Relation Thereto, and to Promote Safety at Sea.”28  The Act, which 
took up approximately twenty pages in the Statutes at Large, was concerned mostly 
with matters such as seamen’s working conditions and life-saving equipment.29  At 
the very end, section 20 received little notice,30 but is the one section that contained 
recovery for injuries suffered onboard a vessel.31 
The Act included a definition of the word “vessel,” which was derived from 
section 65 of the Act of June 7, 1872, which re-enacted the 1866 United States 
Revised Statutes, section 4612.32  That definition read in part: 
In the construction of this chapter, every person having the command of 
any vessel belonging to any citizen of the United States shall be deemed 
to be the ‘master’ thereof; and every person (apprentices excepted) who 
shall be employed or engaged to serve in any capacity on board the same 
shall be deemed and taken to be a ‘seamen’; and the term ‘vessel’ shall be 
understood to comprehend every description of vessel navigating on any 
sea or channel, lake or river to which the provision of this chapter may be 
applicable . . . .33 
Section 20 of the Act of March 4, 1915, was soon amended as part of the Act of 
June 5, 1920, passed by the Sixty-Sixth Congress.34  The complete name of the 1920 
                                                                
27Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, §§ 1-20, 38 Stat. 1164-85. 
28Id. 
29Id. 
30See H.R. REP. No. 1439, 63D CONG., 3d Sess. 25, 30 (1915), 52 CONG. REC. 4639, 4640 
(1915) (noting how Congress treated section 20 of the Act of 1915 with little attention). 
31Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185. 
32Act of June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 277.  The complete title of the Act was, “An Act to 
Authorize the Appointment of Shipping Commissioners by the Several Circuit Courts of the 
United States, to Superintend the Shipping and Discharge of Seaman Engaged in Merchant 
Ships Belonging to the United States, and for the Further Protection of Seamen.”  Id. 
33Id. 
34Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, §§ 1-39, 41 Stat. 988-1008 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 
861-889 (1994)). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
710 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:705 
Act was “An Act to Provide for the Promotion and Maintenance of the American 
Merchant Marine, to Repeal Certain Emergency Legislation, and Provide for the 
Disposition, Regulation, and Use of Property Acquired Thereunder, and for Other 
Purposes.”35  Section 39, in effect, stated that the entire 1920 Act “may be cited as 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.”36   
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 included the Ship Mortgage Act,37 amended 
the Maritime Lien Act of 1910,38 and established the United States Shipping Board.39  
However, it was section 33, which appeared at the end of statute 1007 under the 
subtitle of  “Miscellaneous Provisions”40 that amended section 20 of the Act of 1915.  
Section 33 was unrelated to the balance of the statute, and became more popularly 
known as the Jones Act41 due to the efforts of Senator Wesley L. Jones of 
Washington state who was Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee at the 
time.42 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 included its own definition of the word 
“vessel,” which was different than the one used in the Act of March 4, 1915.  The 
Merchant Marine Act borrowed its terminology from the Shipping Act of 1916.43  
Section 37 of the Merchant Marine Act,44 under the title, “words and terms in act 
defined,” read: “When used in this act unless the context otherwise requires, the 
terms . . . vessel . . . shall have the meaning assigned . . . by sections 1 and 2 of the 
Shipping Act, 1916, as amended by this Act.” 
The definition of “vessel” found in the Shipping Act of 191645 read, “[a]ll 
watercraft and other artificial contrivances of whatever description and at whatever 
stage of construction, whether on the stocks or launched, which are used or are 
capable of being or intended to be used as a means of transportation on water.”46  
But, since “lawmakers amended section 20 of the Act of 1915 by substituting 
                                                                
35Id.  
36Id.; § 39, 41 Stat. 1008 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 889 (1994)). 
37Id.; § 30, 41 Stat. 988, 1000-05 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-916 (1994)). 
38Id.; § 30, 41 Stat. 988, 1005-06 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 971-975 
(1994)). 
39Id.; § 3, 41 Stat. 988, 989-990. 
40Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007. 
41Id. (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994)). 
42See 59 CONG. REC. 8170 (1920).  It was introduced by Senator Jones on February 6, 
1920 as the last section of S. Res. 3876, 66th CONG., 2d Sess. § 3 (1920), and was added by 
the Senate Commerce Committee to H.R. 10,378, 66th CONG., 1st. Sess. (1919). S. Rep. No. 
573, 66th CONG., 2d Sess. 23. 
43Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-44, 39 Stat. 728, as amended by the Act of July 
15, 1918, ch. 152, §1-4, 40 Stat. 900-903 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 801-842 (1994)). 
44Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 37. 
45Id.; § 44 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 842 (1994)).  “This chapter may be cited as 
‘Shipping Act, 1916.’”  Id. 
46Id. 
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section 33 of the [Merchant Marine] Act of 1920,”47 neither the definition of “vessel” 
appearing in the Act of March 4, 1915, nor the definition contained in section 37 of 
the Act of June 5, were found in Section 33 of the Act of June 5, 1920 (the Jones 
Act).48  In fact, the Jones Act contained no definition of the word “vessel,”49 therein, 
creating the problem. 
2.  First, There Must be a Seaman 
As just discussed, the Jones Act does not reference the word vessel.50  It only 
alludes to seamen.  The Jones Act reads in part: 
§ 688. Recovery for injury to or death of seaman 
Any seamen who shall suffer injury in the course of his employment, may 
at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right to 
trial by jury . . . and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any 
such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may 
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury . . . .51 
Predictably, claims by seamen injured in the course of their employment covers a 
large number of all admiralty cases that come before the court.  “A careful 
examination of docket statistics in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana [from 1977-1986] indicates that approximately one-fourth of 
the civil actions filed in that busy court . . . were ‘personal injury--Jones Act cases.”52 
Prior to the Jones Act, there was no remedy in negligence for a seaman to sue his 
employer,53 but “with the passage of the Jones Act . . . Congress secured for seaman 
certain legal advantages when injured.”54  “As Justice Story explained, [since] 
seaman ‘are emphatically the wards of the admiralty’ they ‘are by the peculiarity of 
their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and 
exhausting labour,’”55 and as such, should be provided benefits under the law. 
It may be stating the obvious, but to be a seaman, one must have something to do 
with the sea or water.  Of course, a seaman does not actually have to work on the sea, 
or be a man.  A woman could make a Jones Act claim, and she could be employed 
on a riverboat casino floating on the Mississippi River, miles from the nearest sea.56  
                                                                
47Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 159 (1934). 
48Compare Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20 with Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, §§ 33 & 
37.  
49Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33. 
5046 U.S.C. § 688 (1994). 
51§ 688(a). 
52Peter Beer, Keeping Up With the Jones Act, 61 TUL L. REV. 379, 400 (1986) (compiling 
based on a review by the author, Beer, of the Clerk’s Office Records).  
53Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co., 961 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 1997). 
54Id. 
55Id. (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). 
56See generally Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 
1995) (concerning recovery under the Jones Act for severe injuries to plaintiff’s knee, which 
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“In a broad sense, a seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon 
the sea.”57  But, the presence of some type of “structure” is a necessary ingredient 
since swimmers do not qualify under the Jones Act.58 
Usually, in defining statutory terminology, “[t]he most persuasive evidence of . . . 
[congressional] intent [are] the words selected by Congress.”59  But, Congress failed 
to define the term seaman in the Jones Act.60  However, the Supreme Court in 
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander61 stated that, “‘seamen’ is a maritime term 
of art.  In the absence of contrary indication, we assume that when a statute uses such 
a term, Congress intended it to have its established meaning . . . under the general 
maritime law when Congress passed the Jones Act.”62   
Therefore, it must be determined how the term “seaman” was used in 1920, the 
time the Jones Act was passed.  The traditional definition of a seaman at that period 
was one who could “hand-reef and steer.”63  In the 1916 case of The Buena 
Ventura,64 Judge Hough pointed out “that every one is entitled to the privilege of a 
seaman who, like seamen, at all times contribute to and labor about the operation and 
welfare of the ship . . . .”65  And as one court later said, “The Jones Act . . . speaks 
only of seaman, but courts have naturally spoken of seaman in terms of ships, 
vessels, and voyages.66   So, in short, “For there to be a seaman, there must first be a 
ship.”67 
Therefore, a seaman must have some kind of relationship to a vessel or ship, 
although the specific nature of that connection is outside the scope of this article.68  
                                                          
she claims occurred by tripping over a garbage can lid while working as a cocktail waitress 
aboard a floating dockside casino). 
57Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934).  
58See Delta Country Ventures, Inc. v. Magana, 986 F.2d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that an action for injuries suffered by a fifteen year old boy, who dove off the deck of 
a houseboat into the river and was rendered quadriplegic, bore no relationship to traditional 
concepts of maritime activity).  This was not a Jones Act claim, but there was no admiralty 
jurisdiction anyway.  
59Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Forsyth Energy, Inc., 666 F.2d 
1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting the court’s function in interpreting a statute). 
6046 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994). 
61498 U.S. 337 (1991). 
62Id. at 342. 
63The Ole Oleson, 20 F. 384, 384 (E.D. Wisc. 1884). 
64243 F. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
65Id. at 799. 
66DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Co., 959 F.2d 1119, 1121 (1st Cir. 1992). 
67Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1971). 
68The Supreme Court set the parameters for the term “seaman” in their 1991 landmark 
decision, McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).  Wilander was a 
paint foreman who was injured while assigned to a “paint boat” chartered by McDermott 
International.  His duties consisted of supervising, sandblasting, and painting oil drilling 
platforms in the Persian Gulf.  His injury resulted from a plug blowing out under pressure and 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/5
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The question remains, however, “what is a vessel?”  
3.  In Navigation 
Under the Jones Act, for a structure to be considered a vessel, it must be “in 
navigation”69 even though the phrase does not appear anywhere in the Act itself.  As 
one court said, the term is just another one of the Act’s “several unexplained 
definitions.”70  In fact, the term does not appear in any of the statutes amended by, or 
incorporated into, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, of which the Jones Act was 
part.71  Nevertheless, many students, scholars, academicians, and even judges 
continue to cite to the Jones Act’s “vessel in navigation” requirement in treatises, 
textbooks, and articles. 
The term “vessel in navigation” is actually derived from the 1941 case of 
Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co.72  The Carumbo court held that, “[o]ne cannot be a 
‘member of a crew’ if the ship is not in navigation.”73  Although the Jones Act 
speaks only of seaman,74 many courts like the district court in Carumbo substituted 
the word seaman for the commonly used term, “member of the crew.”  “Indeed, the 
two were often used interchangeably in general maritime cases.”75  In fact, there have 
been hundreds of cases comparing the duties of a “seaman” and those of a “member 
of the crew.”76  But, for our purposes of defining “vessel,” a seaman is the broader 
                                                          
striking him in the face while he was inspecting a pipe.  Id.  The Court held that Wilander 
could not be precluded from seaman status because he did not perform a transportation-related 
function on board or aid in the navigation of a vessel.  Id. at 356.  In Gizoni v. Southwest 
Marine, Inc., 56 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1995), the court developed a two part analysis for 
identifying the relationship of a seaman to a vessel; (1) the seaman had to have a “more or less 
permanent connection” with the vessel, and (2) a seaman’s job must contribute to the function 
or mission of the vessel.  Id. at 1141.  In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995), the 
Supreme Court slightly altered the two element test, and stated; (1) the worker’s duties must 
contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the 
worker must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels) 
that is substantial in both its duration and nature.  Id. at 353.  In the 1997 case of Harbor Tug 
and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997), the Supreme Court once again revisited the 
issue, and declared that “for the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose, the 
nature of the inquiry into the employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether 
the employee’s duties take him to sea.”  Id. at 1540.  
69See Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1997) (holding that a 
worker may establish seaman status based on his connection to an identifiable group of vessels 
in navigation). 
70Johnson v. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1984). 
71See Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, §§ 1-20;  Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-44; 
Act of July 15, 1918, ch. 152, §§ 1-4.  
72123 F.2d 991 (1941). 
73Id. at 995. 
7446 U.S.C. § 688 (1994). 
75McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348 (1991). 
76See generally Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946). 
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term that includes “member of a crew.”77  
Those magic words, “in navigation,” ushered in a whole new era for the 
determination of “what is a vessel?” under the Jones Act.  It set forth a beginning for 
the current line of decisions requiring a seaman to have a connection to a “vessel in 
navigation.”78  The term is still in use today.79  
A “‘vessel’ [in navigation] is one that is capable of use as a vessel even if not 
functioning as such at the moment in question.”80  “As properly construed, the ‘in 
navigation’ requirement is used in its broad sense, and is not confined strictly to 
actual navigating or movement of the vessel, but instead means that the vessel is 
engaged as an instrument of commerce or transportation on navigable waters.”81  
“Case law indicates that a vessel is ‘in navigation’ although moored to a pier, in a 
repair yard for periodic repairs, or while temporarily attached to some object.”82 
The court in Johnson v. Oil Transport Co.83 noted: 
[N]o precise common test for determining when a vessel is in navigation 
underlies the various decisions on the subject.  ‘It is impossible to define 
the phrase (‘in navigation’), in general terms; the words are colloquial and 
their fringe will always be somewhat ragged.  Perhaps the best hope is 
that, as the successive variants appear, they will finally serve rudely to fix 
the borders.’84  
Vessels may be categorized into three groups in order to further isolate the “in 
navigation” requirement:  (1) vessels under construction, (2) stationary vessels, or 
vessels undergoing short term repairs, and (3) vessels permanently removed from 
service.  Only those vessels in the second category qualify as being “in navigation.”  
“Historically, ship construction is not regarded as a traditional maritime activity; 
a ship under construction has not evolved into vessel status.”85  In Tucker v. 
Alexandroff,86 the court eloquently said: 
A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is 
preserved.  Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and 
iron--an ordinary piece of personal property--as distinctly a land structure 
                                                                
77Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 994 (1st Cir. 1941). 
78Wilander, 498 U.S. at 354. 
79See Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1997) (stating there was 
no dispute that the plaintiff worked aboard a “vessel in navigation”); Gipson v. Kajima Eng’g 
and Constr., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 537, 542 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that barge YFN-946 was 
not a “vessel in navigation” under the Jones Act). 
80Farrell Ocean Servs., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1982). 
81Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1975). 
82Id. 
83440 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1971). 
84Id. at 115 (quoting Hawn v. American S.S.Co., 107 F.2d 999, 1000 (2d Cir. 1939)).  
85Orgeron v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 561 So. 2d 38, 42 (La. 1990). 
86183 U.S. 424 (1902). 
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as a house . . . .  In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and 
from the moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and 
becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction.87 
Even “a launched but uncompleted vessel floating or maneuvering in navigable 
waters . . . is not yet an instrumentality of commerce- private or public- and is 
therefore not ‘in navigation.’”88 
In addition, “a vessel does not cease to be a vessel when she is not voyaging, but 
is at anchor, berthed, or at dockside.”89  “[A] vessel which temporarily leaves 
commerce, enters a shipyard for minor repairs, and thereupon returns to commerce 
remains in navigation . . . .”90 
In determining the status of a vessel in repair, the Supreme Court in West v. 
United States91 stated, “the focus should be upon the status of the ship, the pattern of 
the repairs, and the extensive nature of the work contracted to be done, rather than 
the specific type of work that each . . . workman is doing . . . .”92  The court in 
Waganer v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,93 restated the West repair requirements and 
noted, “the ship in question must have been in navigational status, and not ‘dead,’ 
which in turn depends upon whether the contracted work is minor or major, and who 
has custody and control of the ship while the work is being done.”94  “If the owner 
[has] taken control of [the] ship from the contractor at that point, this would be some 
evidence that the ship was in navigation after being taken out of navigation.”95 
The court in Warwick v. Huthnance Division, Grace Offshore Co.96 synthesized 
some of the earlier cases,97 and developed six factors for use in determining whether 
a vessel has been removed from navigation:  
(1) The nature of the repairs being performed on the vessel; (2) The 
duration of these repairs; (3) The cost of those repairs in comparison to 
the value of the vessel; (4) Whether the owner of the vessel has 
relinquished control of the repairs to a third party; (5) The length of time 
in which the vessel was laid up or stacked; (6) Whether the repair work 
was typical of work performed primarily by shore-based employees.98  
                                                                
87Id. at 438. 
88Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1971).  
89DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1121 (1st Cir. 1992). 
90Delome v. Union Barge Line Co., 444 F.2d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 1971). 
91361 U.S. 118 (1959). 
92Id. at 122. 
93486 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1973). 
94Id. at 958. 
95McKinley v. All Alaskan Seafood, Inc., 980 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). 
96760 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. La. 1991). 
97See Abshire v. Sea Coast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1982); Rodgers v. United 
States, 452 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1972). 
98Warwick v. Huthnance Div., Grace Offshore Co., 760 F. Supp. 571, 573 (W.D. 1991). 
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“At some point, however, repairs become sufficiently significant that the vessel 
can no longer be considered in navigation.”99  “Major overhaul or refitting of a vessel 
will take the vessel out of navigation.”100  “It is equally apparent that conversion of 
the vessel from one use to another would also take the ship out of navigation, if the 
change required extensive work.”101 
In one of the more interesting cases, Donald McClendon, who was acting as a 
caretaker on a towboat, attempted to produce gold by cooking mercury inside of a 
potato using the ship’s oven.102  The ship “was in dry-dock for numerous repairs and 
in dire need of a new bottom.  Not surprisingly, McClendon sustained injuries from 
breathing mercury vapors,”103 and made a claim under the Jones Act because he was 
on a vessel in navigation.104  The court found that reasonable persons could not 
conclude that the vessel was in navigation since the ship had no captain or crew, no 
power of her own, and was “undergoing extensive repairs by contract workers which 
would eventually take seventy-seven days to complete and over $25 million to pay 
for.”105 
If a vessel has changed its function, it may lose its navigation ability, and 
consequently lose its vessel status.106  “In Gonzales v. United States Shipping Board 
Emergency Fleet Corp., it was held that a ship is not in navigation if there is no 
present hope or intention of having her go to sea and if it would take a long time to 
put her in shape for an ocean voyage.”107 
As Judge Hale eloquently stated, in the case of Bishop v. Alaska S. S. Co.,108 
when he described a vessel taken permanently out of navigation: 
There was a tang of salt air and movement of wind and wave about the 
S.S. Fortuna as she lay on the blocks in floating dry dock, and perhaps 
gulls perched on her railings or soared above her stacks, and to everyone 
who looked upon her she seemed a ship of the sea.109  
Circuit Judge Timbers also expressed similar sentiments in the case of the 
                                                                
99Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 374 (1991). 
100McKinley, 980 F.2d at 570. 
101Id. 
102McClendon v. OMI Offshore Marine Serv., 807 F. Supp. 1266, 1267 (E.D. Tex. 1992). 
103Id. 
104Id. 
105Id. 
106See Ross v. Moak, 388 F. Supp. 461 (M.D. La. 1975) (holding that a vessel which had 
been turned into a bookstore was no longer in navigation).  
107New England Fish Co. v. Barge or Vessel, Sonya, 332 F. Supp. 463, 468 (D. Alaska 
1971) (citing Gonzales v. U.S. Board of Shipping Emer. Fleet Corp., 3 F.2d 168 (E.D.N.Y. 
1924)). 
108404 P.2d 990 (Wash. 1965).  
109Id. at 991. 
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McCarthy v. The Bark Peking,110 in which the Bark Peking was retired and turned 
into a floating museum.  “The Peking would like nothing more than to slip its 
moorings, ease into the harbor and head for the open seas, with the seagulls in its 
wake.  Sadly, it is fated not to do so.”111 
In the case of Boyd v. Ford Motor Co.,112 the court of appeals identified several 
factors discussed by the district court in their determination that a vessel was taken 
permanently out of service:  
(1) the ship was not sailing and in fact secured with special ‘winter-lines’; 
(2) the full crew was not stationed aboard the ship; (3) the vessel’s main 
engine had been completely ‘torn down’ and was not in operable 
condition; and (4) the vessel had lost her classification with the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and could not regain it without an inspection.113  
B.  Analysis 
In terms of the Jones Act, some courts114 make reference to a “vessel” using 
language from the Supreme Court’s 1903 opinion in The Robert W. Parsons,115 
although that case was decided long before the Jones Act.116  In 1973, the Fifth 
Circuit case of Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc.,117 updated the language of 
The Robert W. Parsons with their own version of what constitutes a vessel,118 and 
                                                                
110676 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1982).  
111Id. at 44. 
112948 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1991). 
113Id. at 286. 
114Admiralty claims are generally heard by a judge, not a jury.  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 38, “Jury Trial of Right”, states, “[a]dmiralty and [m]aritime [c]laims . . . shall not 
be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim 
within the meaning of Rule 9(h).”  FED. R. CIV. P. § 38(e).  However, under the Jones Act, a 
seaman is entitled to a jury trial.  46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).  See also Fitzgerald v. United 
States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (holding that a seaman who joined in a single complaint, 
a maintenance and cure claim and a Jones Act claim, both arising out of one set of facts, was 
entitled to a jury trial).  A seaman may also sue in state court, but that action cannot be 
removed to federal court.  Id. (See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp, 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 
1952); Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that state 
court suits based on Jones Act claims are not removable).  The Jones Act incorporates the anti-
removal provisions from the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), ch. 149, §§ 1-10, 35 
Stat. 65 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994)) as decided by the Supreme Court in 
the case of Panama R Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)).  
115191 U.S. 17, 30 (1903).  “In fact, neither size, form, equipment, nor means of 
propulsion are determinative factors upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the 
purpose for which the craft was constructed, and the business in which it is engaged.”  Id.  
116See Smith v. Texaco Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1313, 1314 (E.D. La. 1981) (discussing the test 
for vessel status). 
117472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973). 
118Id. at 1001.  A vessel is one which is designed or used primarily “for the transportation 
of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place across navigable waters.”  Id. at 1002. 
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many courts have adopted that terminology in one form or another.119  Still other 
courts make use of the general maritime definition of vessel found in Title I of the 
United States Code,120 the text of which, was originally conceived in the Act of 1866.  
That definition was expanded upon by the Supreme Court in their 1887 decision in 
Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co.121 Finally, to further muddy the waters, the 1941 
district court’s holding in Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co.122 stated that a Jones Act 
vessel had to be “in navigation.”123 
As a result, courts have inconsistently interpreted the meaning of the word 
“vessel” using some or all of the elements of Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., The 
Robert W. Parsons, Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., the United States Code, 
and Cape Cod S.S. Co.  For example, in the case of Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph 
Corp.,124 “the court held that a floatable crane was a vessel for purposes of an action 
for breach of warranty of seaworthiness without even deciding whether it was a 
‘vessel in navigation’ for purposes of the Jones Act.”125  Similarly, the court in 
McSweeney v. M.J. Rudolph Corp.,126 also declined to decide whether the same 
floatable crane was a “vessel in navigation” for purposes of the Jones Act.127 
1.  The United States Code Definition 
Some admiralty statutes, which do not contain a definition of the word “vessel,” 
rely on the United States Code’s definition as authority.128  Title 1, “General 
Provisions”, Section 3 of the United States Code states, “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes 
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of 
being used, as a means of transportation on water.”129  In one of the most famous 
quotes in admiralty jurisprudence, Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit thought the Code 
term was so vague, he sarcastically noted, “[n]o doubt the three men in a tub would 
also fit within our definition of ‘vessel’, and one probably could make a convincing 
                                                                
119See Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 82 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996); Powers v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. 
Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984). 
120
“The word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial 
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”  1 U.S.C. § 
3 (1994).  
121119 U.S. 625 (1887). 
122123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941). 
123Id. at 995. 
124514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975). 
125Buccellato v. City of New York, 808 F. Supp. 967, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing 
Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
126575 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
127Buccellato, 808 F. Supp. at 973 (citing McSweeney v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 575 F. 
Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. (1983)). 
128See discussion infra. 
1291 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
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case for Jonah inside the whale.”130 
The Code definition of vessel originally comes from an Act passed by Congress 
in 1866 for the prevention of smuggling.131  The definition then appeared in the 
Revised Statutes of 1873132 before the United States Code was constituted by the Act 
of 1947.133  It is presented in Title 1 of the Code under “Chapter 1.--Rules of 
Construction,”134 “thus indicating that it was enacted as a rule for the construction of 
the federal statutes generally.”135  
In the 1887 case of Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co.,136 the Supreme Court first 
addressed the definition of the word “vessel” found in the 1873 Revised Statutes 
(and later the U.S. Code).  In that case, the plaintiffs argued that their floating dry-
dock was “a large floating vessel and water-craft and artificial contrivance, used and 
capable of being used as a means of transportation in water . . .”137  The Court held 
that, “[a] fixed structure, such as this dry-dock is, not used for the purpose of 
navigation . . . .  The fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or 
vessel . . . .”138  The Court also noted the words of Lord Justice Brett, an English 
court of appeals judge who said that a vessel is something “built in a particular form 
and used for a particular purpose.”139  In effect, the Court required that a structure 
needs to do more than just float, and that one should look to the particular purpose 
for which it was built before determining its status as a vessel. 
Mr. Justice Brown, in the 1903 Supreme Court case of The Robert W. Parsons,140 
took the words of his predecessors in Cope one step further by stating, “[i]n fact, 
neither size, form, equipment, nor means of propulsion are determinative factors 
upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose for which the craft 
was constructed, and the business in which it is engaged.”141 Justice Brown 
seemingly ignored the terminology found in the Revised Statutes, and instead 
borrowed language from earlier court decisions, including The General Cass142 in 
1871.  In that case, the court stated, “[t]he true criterion by which to determine 
whether any water craft, or vessel, is subject to admiralty jurisdiction, is the business 
or employment for which it is intended, or is susceptible of being used, or in which it 
                                                                
130Burks v. American River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1982). 
131Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 1, 14 Stat. 178. 
1321 Rev. St. U.S. § 3 (1873) 
133Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633. 
1341 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
135Lambros Seaplane Base v. the Batory, 215 F.2d 228, 232 (2d Cir. 1954). 
136119 U.S. 625 (1887). 
137Id. at 626.  
138Id. at 627. 
139Id. at 629. 
140191 U.S. 17 (1903). 
141Id. at 30. 
14210 F. Cas. 169 (E.D. Mich. 1871) (No. 5,307). 
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is actually engaged, rather than its size, form, capacity, or means of propulsion.”143  
In the 1944 case of Norton v. Warner Co.,144 the Supreme Court once again 
revisited the general maritime definition of vessel when they determined that a barge 
was a vessel for purposes of resolving an injury claim under the Jones Act.145  Thus, 
on some occasions the court chooses to make use of the general maritime definition 
of the word “vessel,” and at other times they choose not to.  This remains the case 
today.146 
2.  Comparison to the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
A comparison of the Jones Act to the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act (LHWCA) is a useful analysis because like the Jones Act, the LHWCA does not 
contain a definition of the word “vessel.”147  However, most courts interpreting the 
LHWCA have adopted the general maritime definition of “vessel” found in the 
United States Code.148  This leads to an inference that maybe the same theory of 
“adoption” could be made for the Jones Act use of the Code definition.   
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) of 
1927 was remedial legislation intended to provide a remedy to workers injured 
during longshoring activities.149  In reference to a “vessel,” the LHWCA stated: 
the term ‘vessel’ means any vessel upon which or in connection with 
which any person entitled to benefits under this chapter suffers injury or 
death arising out of or in the course of his employment, and said vessel’s 
owner, owner pro hacvice, agent, operator, charter or bare boat charterer, 
master, officer, or crew member.150 
“Obviously this definition does not provide precise guidance as to what is included 
within the term ‘vessel.’  The legislative history similarly is not helpful.”151 
Before enactment of the LHWCA, longshoremen were not covered by admiralty 
remedies, and could not seek relief through state compensation systems.152  The 
                                                                
143Id. at 170 (citing The Kate Tremaine, 14 F. Cas. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 7,622).). 
144321 U.S. 565 (1944). 
145Id. at 571-72. 
146See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1313, 1314 (E.D. La. 1991) (referencing use of 
the general maritime definition). 
147Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), ch. 509, §§ 1-50, 44 
Stat. 1424-46 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994)). 
The 1984 Amendment to the Act substituted “Longshore” for “Longshoremen’s”, 
although the Act is frequently mis-cited using its former name.  Pub. L. 98-426, § 27(d)(1), 98 
Stat. 1654.  
148Kathriner v. UNISEA, Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1992). 
14933 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1994). 
150Id. § 902(21) (1994). 
151McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1983). 
152Merrill v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry., 751 F. Supp. 770, 775 (C.D. Ill. 1990) 
(referencing the LHWCA, ch. 509, § 2(3), 44 Stat. 1426 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 
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LHWCA proceeded to cover workers injured or killed only on navigable waters or 
certain adjoining areas of land.153  This rigid “situs” requirement quickly created 
inconsistent results because “it allowed workers, during their normal work day, to 
walk in and out of LHWCA coverage as they moved to and from dry land.”154  In 
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,155 and the related case of Marine Stevedoring 
Corp. v. Oosting,156 “four workers were injured or killed when a crane knocked them 
from their workplace.  One worker drowned, and because his body fell into the water 
he was covered by the LHWCA; conversely the other three fell onto a pier or were 
crushed against a railroad car,” but the court denied LHWCA coverage to these men 
because they were hurt on land.157 
In response to these types of cases, Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972 by 
broadening the “situs” requirement to allow recovery for “an injury occurring upon 
the navigable waters of the United States including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry 
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily 
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a 
vessel” (emphasis added).158  Unfortunately, in terms of the word “vessel,” this 
amendment added only a “circular definition”159 to the statute. 
Since the LHWCA itself does not provide a definition of the word “vessel,” most 
courts have applied the general maritime definition found in the United States 
Code.160  In fact, “[s]ome courts have stated that [the United States Code definition], 
as a matter of law, provides the LHWCA ‘vessel’ definition.”161  As the court noted 
in McCarthy v. The Bark Peking,162 “[s]ince Congress, in its use of the term ‘vessel’ 
in sections 902(21) and 905(b) [of the LHWCA], did not provide a definition 
different from the generally acknowledged one found in section 3 [of title 1 of the 
United States Code], we may presume, as other courts have, that it intended to adopt 
this commonly-used term.”163 
An argument can be made, therefore, that since the first proviso of the Jones Act 
also does not mention the word vessel,164 the Act should simply adopt the general 
maritime definition, much as the LHWCA has done.  The court in Bollinger Quick 
                                                          
U.S.C. § 903(a) (1994)). 
153P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 70 (1979). 
154Merrill, 751 F. Supp. at 775. 
155396 U.S. 212 (1969). 
156238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965). 
157Merrill, 751 F. Supp. at 775.  
15833 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1994).  The 1972 Amendment to the LHWCA was Pub. L. No. 92-
576, § 1, 86 Stat. 1251. 
159McCarthy, 716 F.2d at 133. 
160DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 106, 108 (D.R.I. 1993). 
161Id. 
162716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983). 
163Id. at 134.  
164See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1994). 
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Repair, Inc. v. M/V Goliath165 commented, “[t]he general definition of ‘vessel’ set 
out by Congress [in the United States Code] . . . applies to every federal statute, 
unless that statute itself prescribes another definition.”166  
Other courts have also stated that the general maritime definition of “vessel” is 
applicable for interpreting Jones Act claims.  “[Although] there is a slightly different 
inquiry in a Jones Act case as distinguished from a LHWCA case [“[a] Jones Act 
seaman must have a more or less permanent attachment to a vessel or fleet of 
vessels, while recovery under . . . the LHWCA can be based upon transitory contact 
with a vessel.”167], [it] is a distinction without significance . . . since . . . these 
additional elements do not render useless Jones Act cases addressing the ‘vessel’ 
issue.”168 
The court in Lash v. Ballard Construction, Co.169 further explained, “The ‘vessel’ 
issue is a jurisdictional issue whether the matter is being considered in the context of 
the Jones Act or the LHWCA, and the additional elements that must be demonstrated 
in a Jones Act case are easily separated from the analysis.”170  Benedict on Admiralty 
also suggested their meanings were to be construed the same, 
While one may not ascribe to the Congress an intent to restate maritime 
law when it enacted a definition for the construction of statutes generally, 
it is highly unlikely that Congress, in formulating a definition of a word of 
so immediate a connection with maritime law and so likely to recur in 
maritime legislation, could have intended materially to depart from the 
meaning under general maritime law.171 
Further support for using the general maritime definition in determining Jones 
Act claims is evidenced by the similarity of language relating to both statutes.  The 
general maritime definition is very similar to the terminology used in the Shipping 
Acts of 1916 and 1918,172 which was later incorporated into the Merchant Marine 
Act of 1920,173 of which the Jones Act was part.174  In fact, except for a few choice 
words, (i.e. stocks), the definition is almost identical.  The Supreme Court stated in 
Warner v. Goltra,175 “[t]he purpose of the lawmakers, clear enough, we believe, upon 
the surface of the act, takes on an added clearness when the act is viewed in the 
                                                                
165965 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Or. 1997). 
166Id. at 1455. 
167Orgeron v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 561 So. 2d 38, 41 (La. 1990). 
168Lash v. Ballard Constr. Co., 707 F. Supp. 461, 463 (W.D. Wash. 1989). 
169707 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Wash. 1989).  
170Id. at 463. 
1711 STEPHEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, § 165, at 10-11 (7th ed. rev. 1997). 
172Compare Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-44, with 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
173Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 37. 
174Id. at § 33. 
175293 U.S. 155 (1934). 
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setting of its history.”176  “We cannot believe that in this process of amendment the 
word[s] . . . lost the broad meaning that it had in the law to be amended . . . .”177  
Arguably then, the language of the U.S. Code could be applicable to Jones Act 
cases.178  
In a final comparison, the Jones Act term, “in navigation,” has taken on a 
meaning virtually identical to the “capability” requirement identified in the general 
maritime jurisdiction.  The latter definition states that a vessel is one that is “used, or 
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”179  In fact, the Fifth 
Circuit in Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enterprises, Inc.180 held that in order 
for a longshoreman to make a claim under the LHWCA, the structure must first 
qualify as a Jones Act vessel.181 
Some courts, however, disagree with the use of the general maritime definition as 
a means of interpreting the Jones Act.  The Fifth Circuit explained in Sohyde Drilling 
& Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.,182 “we are not convinced that the 
term ‘vessel’ for Jones Act purposes, which is subject to liberal construction 
consistent with the purposes of the Act, is necessarily a vessel for other purposes as 
well.”183  The court in Mark Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit,184 remarked that the 
definition of vessel under the LHWCA (the general maritime definition) “is more 
inclusive than that used for evaluating seaman status under the Jones Act.”185  The 
court in McCarthy v. The Bark Peking186 also observed, “[i]n contrast, cases decided 
under the Jones Act . . . have looked to a different test [other than the 1 U.S.C. § 3 
definition], in determining what is a vessel for Jones Act purposes.”187   
In general, there does not appear to be much consensus for using the U.S. Code 
definition of the word vessel in deciding Jones Act claims.  However, its mention in 
some recent cases indicates that it is still a factor that the court considers in making 
their determination of a vessel’s status.  
3.  Resolution 
It quickly becomes apparent how much confusion has arisen over the seemingly 
                                                                
176Id. at 159. 
177Id.  
178Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1973). 
1791 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
180Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enters., Inc., 877 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1989). 
181Id. at 395-96; see also Holifield v. Great Lake Dredge & Dock, Co., CIV.A.92-1935, 
1993 WL 370831, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 1993) (comparing vessels under the Jones Act and 
the LHWCA).  
182644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981). 
183Id. at 1137. 
184No. 94-1581, 1996 WL 37973, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb. 6, 1996). 
185Id. at *3. 
186716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983). 
187Id. at 134. 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
724 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:705 
simple task of defining the word “vessel” under admiralty jurisdiction.  Different 
criteria used at different times have made the process inconsistent and unpredictable.  
One could make a claim under the Jones Act and be denied relief because the vessel 
was not in navigation, but be granted relief under general maritime law because the 
vessel need not be in navigation, all in the same case!188  In Williams v. Avondale 
Shipyards, Inc.,189 “Edgar J. Williams either slipped on an oil spot or became 
engaged in a fistfight” and “struck a pipe instead of a jaw” during a final sea trial run 
of the USCG Cutter Hamilton.190  For purposes of recovery under the Jones Act, the 
vessel was not yet, at such time, an instrumentality of commerce and, therefore, was 
not “in navigation.”191  Under general maritime law, however, the vessel did not need 
to be “in navigation,” and Williams was able to sue the owner for injuries sustained 
while on the incomplete vessel in navigable waters.192  As the court in Salgado v. 
M.J. Rudolph Corp.193 so aptly noted, “[t]here has been so much litigation over the 
meaning and scope of the Jones Act that it has been remarked that the Supreme 
Court should have struck it down ‘as offensive to the due process clause by reason of 
impossibly bad drafting.’”194 
a.  The Car Analogy 
As the previous case illustrates, the law does not recognize the same concept of 
the word “vessel” under all statutes in admiralty.  This is an odd notion, given that 
most people presumably know what a ship or vessel is, much as they do a car.195  
This analogy is better exemplified by the 1919 Supreme Court decision in McBoyle 
v. United States.196  In that case, the petitioner was convicted of transporting from 
Ottawa, Illinois to Guymon, Oklahoma an airplane that he knew to have been stolen.  
The question was whether the National Motor Vehicle Act Theft Act applied to 
airplanes.  The Act stated that “[t]he term ‘motor vehicle’ shall include an 
automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-
propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails . . . .”197  Justice Holmes noted: 
                                                                
188See Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 956-57 (5th Cir. 1971). 
189Id. at 955. 
190Id. at 956-57. 
191Id. at 959. 
192Hall v. Hvide Hull No. 3, 746 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1984) (referencing the decision in 
Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
193514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975). 
194Id. at 753 (quoting GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 
282 (1st ed. 1957) referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Panama R Co. v. Johnson, 264 
U.S. 375 (1924)).  Regardless of how badly the Jones Act was drafted, the court in Leonard v. 
Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522 (1978), noted that cases which “deviate from the general practice 
[of] permitting Jones Act issues to be submitted to the jury . . . should be applied 
restrictively.”  Id. at 524. 
195See generally McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
196Id. 
197Id. at 26. 
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No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word [vehicle] to signify 
a conveyance working on land, water or air . . .  But in everyday speech 
‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land . . . . 
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of 
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning 
should be given to the world in language that the common world will 
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is crossed.  
When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common 
mind only [a commonly held notion], the statute should not be 
extended . . . upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, 
very likely broader words would have been used.198 
Justice Holmes’ “vehicle essay” can easily be applied in a more present day 
context.  In today’s world, cars come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and styles.  
Numerous types of people drive a car: doctors, students, lawyers, janitors, and 
grandparents to name just a few.  Under one law, a person may get their driver’s 
license revoked for driving while intoxicated,199 while under another law, a fine may 
be levied for blasting the car stereo too loudly.200  The serviceman working on your 
car may be sued for negligent repairs and breach of contract under one law,201 or the 
auto dealer may be required to substitute a new car under some consumer protection 
“lemon” laws.202  In each case, there is some connection to a car, and a wrong has 
been committed, yet the answer to “what is a car?” remains the same regardless of 
which law is applied.203  Whether the “connection” to the car is by a driver, 
repairman, or dealer, or whether it is a Cadillac or Jeep, a car has certain and distinct 
readily identifiable characteristics (i.e. engine, wheels).  A car is a car is a car is a 
car.   
                                                                
198Id. at 26-27. 
199CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153(a) (West 1998).  “It is unlawful while under the influence of 
any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage or 
drug, to drive a vehicle . . . .”  Id.  
200CAL. VEH. CODE § 27007 (West 1985).  “No driver of a vehicle shall operate, or permit 
the operation of, any sound amplification system which can heard outside the vehicle from 50 
or more feet . . . .”  Id. 
201CAL. COM. CODE § 2711 (West 1964).  “Where the seller fails to make delivery or 
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance . . . the buyer may 
cancel . . . .”  Id. 
202CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West 1970).  “If the manufacturer or its representative in this 
state does not service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the applicable express 
warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly 
replace the new motor vehicle . . . or promptly make restitution to the buyer . . . .”  Id. 
203See CAL. VEH. CODE § 415 (West 1987).  “‘A motor vehicle’” is a vehicle that is self-
propelled.”  Id.; See also CAL. VEH. CODE § 100 (West 1987).  “Unless the provision or 
context otherwise requires, these definitions shall govern the construction of this code.”  Id.; 
CAL. VEH. CODE § 10 (West 1959).  “Whenever any reference is made to any portion of this 
code or any other law, such reference shall apply to all amendments and additions heretofore 
or hereafter made.”  Id. 
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Justice Holmes’ essay can easily be analogized to the issue of “what is a vessel?”  
To paraphrase, it is possible to interpret the word vessel by conjuring up all kinds of 
strange objects that might somehow find their way onto a body of water.  Yet, in 
everyday speech, a vessel, much like a car, has inherent common characteristics.  It 
is only reasonable for the law to take that common understanding of vessel, so that 
people have an opportunity to gain some knowledge of the rules for which they 
apply.  As the Fifth Circuit noted, “a kangaroo is no less a kangaroo because it is 
carried for part of its existence in another kangaroo’s pouch.”204 
The rules of statutory construction do “not exclude the application of common 
sense to the terms made use of in the act in order to avoid an absurdity, which the 
legislature ought not to be presumed to have intended.”205  “The proper course in all 
cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context, and 
promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.”206 
If the term “vessel” was meant to imply a greater meaning than that which is 
commonly understood, the drafters of the legislation would have made that point 
implicitly clear.207  Therefore, we are left with a definition of the term which most 
ordinary, prudent people commonly hold.  As the court in Sacramento Navigation 
Co. v. Salz208 noted, “[t]he fact that we are dealing with vessels, which by a fiction of 
the law are invested with personality, does not require us to disregard the actualities 
of the situation . . . .”209 
Directly on point was the frustration experienced by dissenting Circuit Judge 
Toreulla in the case of DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc.210  In that case, the court 
held that the “BETTY F,” which was a steel hulled barge designed to transport 
cargo, was not a vessel under the Jones Act because it was being used only as a work 
platform and had no means of self propulsion.211  Judge Toreulla argued that 
“[n]otwithstanding the lack of a statutory definition for the term ‘vessel’ in the Jones 
Act . . . at least twenty-four maritime or maritime related laws define ‘vessel’ in such 
manner as to clearly include the “BETTY F” within the scope of their description.”212  
In his frustration, Judge Toreulla said: 
William Shakespeare tells us in a famous passage from Romeo and Juliet 
that labels are not important, but rather that content is what counts.  In 
more recent times, Gertrude Stein had similar advice.  Although poetic 
                                                                
204Farrell Ocean Servs., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Wirth 
Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
205United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 385, 396 (1867). 
206Id. 
207McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (holding that Congress 
intended the language of the Jones Act to mean today what it meant at the time the Jones Act 
was passed in 1920).  
208273 U.S. 326 (1927).  
209Id. at 328. 
210959 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992) (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
211Id. at 1120. 
212Id. at 1124. 
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philosophy seems far removed from the hard world of maritime torts, I 
believe that the counsel found in those quotations has definite relevance to 
the issue that separates my views from those of my colleagues in the 
majority. 
“What’s in a name?  That which we call a rose  
By any other name would smell as sweet.” 
Shakespeare, William, Romeo and Juliet, II, ii, 43. 
 
“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”  
Stein, Gertrude, Sacred Emily (1913).213 
b.  The Three Prong Test 
The lack of a generally recognized definition of the word “vessel” is probably 
inconsequential in a great number of maritime cases, since the structure in question 
is obviously engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers over water, and fits 
within the common sense notion of the term.  However, problems do arise in trying 
to determine whether a structure is a “vessel” in cases involving floating docks, ships 
under construction or out of service, and special function or unusual crafts.  Since 
“[a] jury is too blunt an instrument to answer a complex question of legal 
policy. . . ;”214 a step-by-step procedure could be of great benefit to those whose 
responsibility it is to determine whether a structure classifies as a vessel.  Hence, my 
three prong test follows. 
My three-factor test or three-prong approach provides some guidance through the 
maze of inconsistency.  It is designed to eliminate many of the uncertainties that 
exist in this area, and create a standard of tests in order to produce more consistent 
results.  These tests mesh all of the critical elements previously discussed into a 
three-factor examination, in which each factor must be answered in the affirmative in 
order to continue onto the next level.   
The first prong I call the “floatation test.”  To meet the requirements of this 
prong, the structure must comply with the general maritime definition found in the 
United States Code which states, “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means 
of transportation on water.”215  To paraphrase this definition, all vessels must, at a 
minimum, float or be capable of floating.  The basis for including this requirement 
rests in the general statutory notion that, to the extent a maritime claim is governed 
by federal statute, that definition should control, otherwise the general maritime 
definition of the Code will control.216  
The test mandates that a structure will not be considered a vessel if it is incapable 
of independent floatation, or somehow maintains a permanent affixation to land.  
Conversely, if the attachment to land is merely temporary, or there is no attachment 
at all, and the structure is capable of floatation, one proceeds to the next factor of the 
                                                                
213Id. 
214Boy Scouts of America v. Graham, 76 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1996). 
2151 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
216Bollinger Quick Repair, Inc. v. M/V Goliath, 965 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (D. Or. 1997). 
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analysis. 
One of more interesting cases was the situation in  Provost v. Huber.217  Paul 
Huber “purchased a two-story frame house in Bayfield County, Wisconsin with the 
purpose in mind of moving the structure from the mainland to a lot on Madeline 
Island situated in Lake Superior.  Huber hired a housemover to transport the building 
and contents by truck-trailer over the frozen surface of Lake Superior.”218  “[A]t a 
point approximately three-fourths of the way to the island, the truck, trailer, house 
and contents broke through the ice.219  Huber claimed that the tractor-trailer was a 
“vessel” because he was transporting the house over water.  The court declared, 
“[b]y no stretch of the imagination can we equate a multi-wheeled device, designed 
and built for the purpose of transportation over a hard, defined surface such as roads, 
highways, and even ice with a vessel or ship as those terms are useful in maritime 
law.”220  Clearly, Huber’s truck was incapable of floatation, and would flunk the first 
prong of the test.221 
In the case of Nolan v. Coating Specialists, Inc.,222 a sand blaster-spray painter 
was injured while working on a stationary drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico.  
He made a claim under Jones Act jurisdiction,223 but the court of appeals affirmed the 
district court’s holding that fixed offshore platforms are not vessels, and workmen 
who perform all of their duties on such platforms are not seaman.224 
In Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Services, Inc.,225 George E. 
Blanchard, a mechanic, was injured while working on compressors located in 
shallow waters near a marshy area in the Mississippi River delta.  Two of the 
compressors were housed in a building which stood on pilings driven into the 
ground.  The other two compressors were housed in buildings mounted on 
submersible barges.226  The court held that the buildings mounted on virtually sunken 
barges were not vessels under the Jones Act227 since they were permanently attached 
to the ocean floor.  The court further noted that, “[o]ur holding might be different if 
                                                                
217594 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979). 
218Id. at 718. 
219Id. 
220Id. at 719. 
221An interesting side note about Huber was that a short time later, he “was approached by 
an individual representing himself to be an underwater contractor and who suggested that the 
house be sunk to the bottom of the lake to preserve and protect it from ice damage until such 
time that it could be raised when the weather permitted.”  Id.  Unfortunately for Mr. Huber, he 
agreed, and the house was lowered to the bottom of the lake by placing sandbags on its floor.  
When the weather finally warmed up, an attempt was made to retrieve the house, but it was 
completely destroyed as it was being raised.  Id.  
222422 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1970). 
223Id. at 378. 
224Id. at 379. 
225575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1978). 
226Id. at 1141. 
227Id. at 1141-42. 
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Blanchard had been injured while the structures were being floated into position.”228  
The court’s conjecture presumably depended upon the intended purpose of the 
barges before they were sunk into place.  This leads into Prong two, “Purpose.” 
My second prong asks the question, “what is the purpose of the craft?”  Under 
this prong, the analysis is accomplished by using the concepts outlined in two turn of 
the century Supreme Court cases, Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co.229 and The Robert 
W. Parsons.230   Here, one looks to “the purpose for which the craft was constructed 
and the business it which it is engaged.”231  The more modern terminology was 
developed in 1973 by the Fifth Circuit in the case of Cook v. Belden Concrete 
Products, Inc.232  In Cook, the court defined a vessel’s purpose as being, “designed 
for transportation of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place across 
navigable waters.”233  That definition appears to have been adopted in one form or 
another by virtually every other circuit.234 
Identifying the purpose is critical because, “[m]ere floatation on water does not 
constitute a structure a ‘vessel’. . . .”235  Rafts and special purpose structures get 
special scrutiny under this query. 
This prong is designed to eliminate the absurdity used by some courts in 
rationalizing their opinions when considering the status of a vessel.  It is this liberal 
interpretation which has sometimes crept its way into the fray, as evidenced by the 
court’s statement in McCarthy v. The Bark Peking,236 “virtually any capacity for use 
as seagoing transportation--perhaps even the hypothetically plausible possibility has 
sufficed to lend the dignity of ‘vessel’ status to a host of seemingly unlikely craft.”237 
In A Raft of Spars,238 the court held that a raft of logs, with no one aboard, 
floating down the East River was within admiralty jurisdiction.239  Chief Justice 
Taney of the Maryland Supreme Court held otherwise in the 1853 case of Tome v. 
Four Cribs of Lumber.240  In that case, Taney said that rafts “are not the subject-
matter of admiralty jurisdiction . . . .”241  “They are not vehicles intended for the 
                                                                
228Id. at 1143, n.5. 
229See generally Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887). 
230See generally The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903). 
231Id. at 30. 
232472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973). 
233Id. at 1002. 
234See Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 82 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996); Powers v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. 
Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984). 
235Cook, 472 F.2d at 1001. 
236716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983). 
237Id. at 134  
23820 F. Cas. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 11,529). 
239Id. at 175. 
24024 F. Cas. 18 (C.C.D. Md. 1853) (No. 14,083). 
241Id. at 24. 
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navigation of the sea, or the arms of the sea; they are not recognised[sic] as 
instruments of commerce or navigation by any act of congress . . . .”242  Those words 
could be probably be applied to any number of special purpose craft today.  Compare 
the case of Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.243 decided 120 years later in which the 
court held that a raft, made of 12 X 12 timbers bonded together, was not a vessel in 
spite of its occasional voyages and “brief movement [which] consisted of being 
hauled, poled or paddled . . . .”244  The court stated that the raft’s transportation was 
“incidental to its intended use.”245 
In the case of Garret v. Dean Shank Drilling Co.,246 Richie Garret made a claim 
under the Jones Act for injuries suffered aboard a barge he was working.  The barge, 
moored in the navigable waters of Louisiana, consisted of a hull and flat deck only 
but was being outfitted with fixtures and appurtenances necessary to render it 
capable for use as an oil and gas drilling rig.247  The court of appeals agreed with 
Garret’s employer that the barge was never in navigation for the purpose for which it 
was intended, and therefore not a vessel in navigation.248   
There was also the case of Wenzel’s Estate by Mirikitani v. Seaward Marine 
Services, Inc.249  In that case, Kenneth Wenzel was assigned to clean the hull of the 
USS Rathburne.  “Underwater divers, utilizing hand-held scrapers, brushes and a 
device known as the ‘SCAMP’, accomplished the cleaning process.  ‘SCAMP’ is an 
acronym for a submersible cleaning and maintenance platform,”250 which was a 
saucer shaped unit, equipped with an impeller capable of being “operated by remote 
control or steered manually by divers.”251  While he was underwater, cleaning the  
hull, Wenzel died of asphyxiation.  Wenzel’s estate claimed that the “SCAMP” was 
a vessel, and he was a seaman assigned to it.252  The court of appeals held that it was 
an error for the district court to determine as a matter of law that the “SCAMP” was 
not a vessel, and remanded the issue back to them.253  
The harder cases to analyze on this point are those which involve permanent 
structures, such as offshore drilling rigs, which have to be floated into place before 
arriving at their final resting spot.  Clearly, these structures are not vessels once 
attached to the ocean or river floor.254  But, the question of their status while being 
                                                                
242Id. 
243477 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1973). 
244Id. at 647. 
245Id. 
246799 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1986). 
247Id. at 1008-09. 
248Id. at 1011. 
249709 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983). 
250Id. at 1326-27. 
251Id. at 1327-28. 
252Id. at 1327. 
253Id. at 1328. 
254See Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1978) 
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transported into position is an issue. 
The court in Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc.,255 distinguished two 
different types of movement for establishing the purpose for which a craft is 
constructed.  The first movement was that of a conventional ship or barge used “for 
transportation of passengers, cargo or equipment from place to place across 
navigable waters.”256  The second was the “movement, both perpendicular and 
lateral, [which] is necessarily part of the regular operation of floating dry docks and 
similar structures.”  Such capability alone, would be “insufficient to establish that 
such craft are construed for the purpose of navigation.”257 
Using these criteria, the positioning of an offshore oilrig, would be movement 
incidental to its intended function of drilling, and therefore, would not qualify it as a 
vessel during its temporary transportation.  In the case of Smith v. Massman 
Construction Co.,258 the plaintiff was injured while working “as a welder on a 
structure known as a caisson.”259  “The caisson resembles a large topless steel box 
approximately 200 feet long, 84 feet wide, and 20 feet high,”260 which was later to 
become part of a concrete bridge pier.261  The court held that the caisson was not a 
vessel under the Jones Act, even though it carried men and equipment while in 
tow.262 
My third prong requires a vessel to be “in navigation.”  Using the same principle 
to discount those vessels which have been withdrawn from navigation and those 
vessels which have not yet entered navigation,263 only those structures which are at 
use, temporarily at rest, or undergoing “short term” repairs would qualify as a vessel.  
This test would eliminate those vessels which have not yet been built, and those 
which have been totally removed from service.  “[A]n incompleted vessel has yet to 
take her place in commerce and navigation; whereas a vessel which has been 
commissioned and taken into navigation and commerce remains in that status even 
when coming into a dock and undergoing certain repairs.”264 
In the case of Caruso v. Sterling Yacht and Shipbuilders, Inc.,265 Francine Caruso 
was hired as a cook for the newly constructed vessel, “Bengale I.”  “Caruso injured 
                                                          
(holding that a submersed barge, permanently affixed to the ocean floor, was not a vessel). 
255472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973). 
256Id. at 1002 (holding that the limited movement of a structure is not dispositive of vessel 
status, but the determinative question of a craft’s status depends on the purpose for which it 
was constructed and the business in which it was engaged). 
257Id. 
258607 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1979). 
259Id. 
260Id. 
261Id. 
262Id. at 89. 
263Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1971). 
264Id. at 958, n.5. 
265828 F.2d 14 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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her toe while quartered ashore in a hotel,” and brought an action under the Jones 
Act.266  Although launched and afloat, the court of appeals affirmed summary 
judgment for the defendant since the vessel had not been tested at sea trials nor 
delivered to her owner, and was not yet a vessel “in navigation.”267 
Compare the 1983 case of McCarthy v. The Bark Peking.268  Craig McCarthy was 
injured “while painting the upper mainmast and spars of the Bark Peking, a museum 
vessel on exhibit as one of the artifacts at the South Street Seaport Museum.”269  The 
vessel’s rudder had been welded into one position, and the ship had not been put to 
sea for over 50 years.270  The court of appeals nevertheless held that the Peking 
remained a vessel despite her age and current use “as long as she rides at anchor in 
the harbor, ready and able to head for the open seas . . . .”271 
A similar situation occurred in Luna v. Star of India.272  In this case, a visitor who 
slipped and fell on a stairway aboard the Star of India, the oldest merchant vessel 
afloat, built in 1863, brought an action.273  The ship was operated by the Maritime 
Museum Association of San Diego, and was moored in North San Diego Bay as a 
visitor attraction.  It had been removed from commerce for over forty years.274  
Nonetheless, the court held that the craft was still a vessel under admiralty 
jurisdiction because “[s]he has a crew consisting of a licensed master or mate, and 
two or three seaman.  Her mooring lines and chains can readily be cast off, and the 
electric wires are so fitted as to be easily detachable.”275  In addition, visitors “come 
aboard [her] to enjoy the unique experience of trodding the decks and inspecting the 
lofty rigging of an old sea voyager,”276 and not “merely to view the memorabilia 
collected below in a few glass cases . . . .”277 
Finally, an example of a vessel removed from service was the case of Kathriner 
v. UNISEA, Inc.278  The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
hull of a liberty ship which had been converted into a floating fish factory, but which 
was permanently anchored and tied to a dock, “hooked up to city sewage, city water 
mains, telephone lines and cable television,”279 was not a “vessel in navigation” for 
                                                                
266Id. at 15. 
267Id. at 15-16. 
268716 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1983). 
269Id. at 132. 
270Id. 
271Id. at 135-36. 
272356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
273Id. at 60. 
274Id. 
275Id. at 66 (quoting The Showboat, 47 F.2d 286 (D. Mass. 1930)). 
276Id. 
277Luna, 356 F. Supp. at 66. 
278975 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1992). 
279Id. at 658-59. 
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purposes of the Jones Act.280  The court stated that the vessel was unfit for offshore 
use, and would surely sink if put out to sea.281 
In summary, all three prongs need to be satisfied for a structure to be termed a 
vessel.  Failure to satisfy any one of the above tests will condemn the structure to 
non-vessel status, and disqualify any person making a claim under such a 
presumption. 
The three prong test has universal application as well.  There are many admiralty 
statutes which relate specifically to an area of law, and which provide relief 
depending on certain circumstances.  For example, under the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act, whether one is or is not a “member of the crew” is a 
vital consideration when making a claim.282  Under the Jones Act, a seaman, or his 
personal representative in case of the death of any seaman must make a claim.283  
The Death on the High Seas Act created a wrongful death action for persons killed 
on the high seas.284  Nevertheless, the three prong test could be adopted to determine 
vessel status in any of these admiralty statutes.  Although these statutes define 
specific requirements concerning the individual making the claim, and the 
relationship that they must maintain with their employer or to a vessel, the notion of 
“what is a vessel?” suggests that an independent analysis can be made in isolation, 
apart from the other statutory factors.   
c.  Airplanes and Helicopters 
To challenge the methodology of my three prong test by using it to determine 
whether floating docks and underwater diving platforms are “vessels” would prove 
too easy.  A much harder test, and the real opportunity for criticism comes on the 
test’s ability to identify jet aircraft as vessels in light of the history on the subject. 
The notion of considering airplanes and helicopters as performing some kind of 
traditional maritime activity is a strange concept to many, and seems to stretch the 
statutorial interpretation of “vessel” to its limit.  Nonetheless, under certain 
circumstances these structures have been included under admiralty jurisdiction.  The 
“high-water” mark in this area of law was the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in 
Executive Jet, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.285  In that case, the Court held that claims 
                                                                
280Id. at 663. 
281Id. at 660. 
282See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994). 
283See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994). 
284See Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, §§ 1-8, 41 Stat. 537-538, (1920) (codified at 
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1994)). 
285409 U.S. 249 (1972).  In this case a jet aircraft “struck a flock of seagulls as it was 
taking off from Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, Ohio, adjacent to Lake Erie.  As a 
result, the plane lost its power, crashed and ultimately sank in the navigable waters of Lake 
Erie, a short distance from the airport.”  Id. at 250. 
The Supreme Court held that the location of the incident by itself was not demonstrative 
of a maritime tort, 
unlike waterborne vessels, [aircraft] are not restrained by one-dimensional geographic 
and physical boundaries.  For this elementary reason, we conclude that the mere fact 
that the alleged wrong ‘occurs’ or ‘is located’ on or over navigable waters--whatever 
that means in an aviation context--is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane 
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arising from airplane accidents may be cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction if the 
“wrong bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."286  As a 
result of this landmark decision, most aviation admiralty tort cases are regarded as 
either “pre-Executive Jet,”287 or after Executive Jet. 
Generally speaking, aircraft are not considered to be vessels for purposes of 
invoking admiralty jurisdiction.  Looking at previous definitions of vessel as already 
identified in the Act of 1866, and the Revised Statutes, it is certain that Congress did 
not have airplanes in mind when they defined “vessel,” since both of those statutes 
derive from enactments prior to its invention.288  Even by 1920, and the passage of 
the Jones Act, “it can hardly be thought that, Congress intended or believed that the 
term ‘vessel’ included the primitive aircraft then in use.”289  But, “statutes are not 
confined in application to contemporary instances and that their principles are to be 
extended to embrace new factual situations and new technological developments.”290  
“[F]or Jones Act purposes, the term vessel may include ‘special purpose 
structures’ . . . even though such structures were not conceived of until long after the 
Jones Act was adopted.”291 
Some courts still hold that helicopters perform a traditional maritime activity 
when transporting passengers and supplies to offshore sites.292  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
negligence case into a ‘maritime tort.’  It is far more consistent with the history and 
purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to 
traditional maritime activity.  Id. at 268. 
The result of Executive Jet was the development of a two-part “locality plus” test in 
defining an aviation maritime tort.  That test requires a showing that: (1) the alleged wrong 
occurs over navigable water, and (2) the wrong bears a significant relationship to a traditional 
maritime activity.  Id. at 271. 
The Supreme Court had little difficulty in concluding that “a flight that would have been 
almost entirely over land and was within the continental United States” bore an insufficient 
relationship with traditional maritime activity.”  Id. at 272.  But, the Court left the door open 
regarding the possibility that an aircraft could be engaged in a maritime activity during a 
transoceanic flight, 
We need not decide today whether an aviation tort can ever, under any circumstances, bear 
a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity to come within admiralty jurisdiction 
in the absence of legislation.  It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying from New 
York to London crashed over the mid-Atlantic, there would be admiralty jurisdiction over 
resulting tort claims even absent a specific statute.  An aircraft in that situation might be 
thought to bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity because it would be 
performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels.  Id. at 271.  
286Id. at 268. 
287Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.C.V.I. 1977) (referring 
to some of the “pre-Executive Jet” confusion as to when admiralty jurisdiction attaches). 
288Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1113 (5th Cir. 1982). 
289Id. 
290Id. 
291Id. 
292See Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky, 116 F.R.D. 397, 416 (D. Conn. 1987) 
(holding that a helicopter “used to ferry passengers and supplies to and from off-shore drilling 
structures . . . bears a significantly sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity . . . 
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has not revisited this issue, causing some consternation in the lower courts.  One 
court noted, “there is still unheeded the call for the Supreme Court to . . . review a 
case and either accept the expansionist view of admiralty jurisdiction [regarding 
aircraft] and provide proper guidelines for the application of such jurisdiction or it 
should clearly limit the jurisdiction to traditional matters of a maritime nature. . . .”293   
In those instances when airplanes and helicopters are allegedly engaged in a 
“traditional maritime activity,”294 my three prong test can be a useful tool in the 
determining the vessel status of these structures.  To do such an analysis will take no 
more of an ideological leap than the Supreme Court itself took in Executive Jet when 
making the inference.295 
The first prong of my test emphasizes the general maritime definition, which 
requires that an object must be capable of floatation.296  Clearly, jet airplanes are not 
designed for floatation.297  So, one may immediately think that an airplane is doomed 
from the outset of the test, failing the first prong, and requiring no further analysis.  
This is an incorrect assumption. 
Using a more conceptual approach, the airplane itself is not designed to float, but 
certainly its passengers are.  All airplanes making transoceanic flights are equipped 
with inflatable rafts, life preservers for each passenger, and a variety of other 
paraphernalia available to crewmembers should the plane go down over the ocean.298  
This distinction is made to differentiate airplane passengers, from say bus or train 
riders, who have no access to overwater life saving gear. 
Airplanes traveling over land from point to point within the continental United 
States would normally not be required to carry this specialized equipment.299  The 
idea is directly on point with the Supreme Court’s statement that “flights within the 
continental United States, which are primarily over land” would not be considered a 
traditional maritime activity.300  Case law also clearly supports this theory.  A review 
of Reeves v. Offshore Logistics, Inc.301 indicates the courts refusal to acknowledge 
that a helicopter without pontoons could be engaged in a traditional maritime 
activity,302 but one containing all the accouterments of a flying “vessel” could meet 
                                                          
.”).  Id. 
293Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.C.V.I. 1977) (quoting 
Thomas O. White, The Admiralty Jurisdiction Adrift, 28 PITT. L. REV. 635, 642 (1967)). 
294See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 257 (1972) 
(bringing a tort under federal admiralty jurisdiction requires “some relationship between the 
tort and traditional maritime activities . . . .”). 
295Id. at 271. 
296See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
29749 U.S.C. §§ 40101-49105 (1994)).  “[A]ircraft” means any contrivance invented, used, 
or designated to navigate, or fly in, the air.”  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6); “‘Aircraft’ means a 
device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.”  14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998). 
29814 C.F.R. §§ 25.801, 25.1411, 25.1415 (1998). 
29914 C.F.R. § 25.1411 (1998). 
300Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266 (1972). 
301720 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1983). 
302See id. at 836. 
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the Executive Jet test.303 
Therefore, although airplanes themselves are not floatable objects, those on board 
are definitely equipped to handle an unexpected watery landing.  In this view, an 
airplane can be considered as having the “capability”304 of floating on water, and thus 
satisfying the first prong of the test. 
The second phase of the three prong test requires that a structure’s purpose be the 
transportation of cargo or people across navigable water.  Certainly, aircraft are in 
business of commerce, and transport people and things from place to place.305  By 
conceding that an aircraft, flying at 30,000 feet over the ocean, is engaged in the 
transportation of people and cargo “across” water, one uses the same premise as that 
applied by the Supreme Court in their Executive Jet decision when they indicated 
that an overseas flight might be considered an activity which is traditionally 
maritime in nature.306  Therefore, the second prong of the test has been satisfied. 
The third prong of the test requires that a vessel be “in navigation.”  In terms of 
aviation, this translates into actual flight or preparation for such.307  Thus, the third 
prong is met. 
As indicated, the three prong test has multiple uses, and can easily be adapted to 
a variety of circumstances, including those cases involving helicopters, airplanes and 
other unusual, special function watercraft.  The test is easy to administer, and should 
prove helpful in providing additional guidance for the courts as they continue to 
struggle with trying to identify uniform characteristics common to all vessels. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
One may take the position that very few differences exist amongst the circuits 
with regards to their interpretation of the word vessel, and that most opinions 
ultimately reach the same conclusion.  Others subscribe to the fact that each 
jurisdiction has created their own unique “twist” on the issue, and  prescribed just 
how to address the question.  Whichever view is taken, a clear and straightforward 
approach would nonetheless benefit all involved. 
The use of my three prong test should eliminate some of the ambiguities that 
appear to exist, and provide a more consistent result.  Every year, it seems, new 
kinds of waterborne craft are introduced into the marketplace.  Nevertheless, my 
three prong test is capable of successfully analyzing situations concerning both the 
                                                                
303See id.; see generally Cesar v. United Tech., 562 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
304See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).  “The word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as means of transportation on 
water.”  Id. 
30514 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998).  “‘Air commerce’ means interstate, overseas, or foreign air 
commerce or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft 
within the limits of any Federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which 
directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air 
commerce.”  Id.; “‘Air transportation’ means interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation 
or the transportation of mail by aircraft.”  Id. 
306See generally Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). 
30749 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (1998).  “‘[A]ircraft’ means any contrivance invented, used, or 
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”  Id. 
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newest technologies, as well as the most mundane of cases.  For those whose 
responsibility it is to determine “what is a vessel?” in the surrounds of a judicial 
proceeding, the three part test should be a welcome sight on the nautical horizon. 
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